Anchorman
Emerged
So can NIGEL, he CAN just also WAIT IT OUT... imo...!
AVZ Discussion 2022
- Thread starter GazDix
- Start date
Yes that could be TRUE..???????????????
But maybe the DRC will not be that patient.. and just give the US or the CHINESE a M L for the SOUTH
Remember that ZIJIN has the NORTH and a M L..!
Also remember the DRC will not ENGAGE with AVZ...NIGEL SAID
Then by this by NIGEL AVZ ANN, the DRC will not WAIT for AVZ...imo
AVZ Minerals Limited (AVZ or Company) is aware of the signing of a framework agreement between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (GDRC) and Kobold Metals Company (Kobold) (GDRC Kobold Agreement) which, amongst other things, purports to include a commitment by GDRC and Kobold to develop the southern section of the Manono Lithium and Tin Project (Manono Project).
Skar
Regular
Correct, current administration will NOT deal with AVZ and DRC may not wait and illegally circumvent their own laws (like they did with the north). Problem is, that really only leaves China for DRC to deal with, as any western company will have to abide by the rule of law\international court decisions and cannot get involved (from a risk management point of view) with any pending legal issues (or engage in any corrupt dealings).
A few outcomes here, US wanting access to Congo facilitates free democratic elections to organise a more stable and ideologically aligned government that will uphold the law, AVZ finds another buyer the DRC will treat with if Kobold wont pay up or the project is illegally seized (we already have a ruling for DRC to not take any action while disputes are ongoing) and the DRC face sanctions asset seizures in western friendly jurisdictions once arbitration is ruled in our favour (or at some point along the way a settlement is reached for fair value with the DRC).
OmarsCominYo
Member
Food for thought with Zijin coincidentally setting up office in the same West Perth building as AVZ and the likes of tolate hiding in the walls for the CCP.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/e...-5-billion-a-year-asio-shows-us-the-receipts/
Espionage costs Australia more than $12.5 billion a year: ASIO shows us the receipts
Spying by nation states is not new, and despite our geography, Australia has never been immune. This was made abundantly clear in a unique study, released last night by Director-General of Security Mike Burgess. Thanks to this study, Australians now have a sophisticated estimate of the cost of espionage directed against our governments, businesses and universities: at least $12.5 billion in just a single year.
While giving the 26th annual Hawke lecture, Burgess was measured, but still frank in his disbelief at the mix of inertia, naivety and fatalism that Australians are demonstrating across sectors (not just across government departments) in response to the threat of espionage. Burgess outlined that on all levels—government, industry and individual—behavioural responses are key to arresting the threat, or at least mitigating it more effectively. This tells us we need to stop leaving the house unlocked while shouting down the street that we have valuables on the kitchen bench.
As the result of a unique study by the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) on behalf of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, The Cost of Espionage does what it says on the tin: it uses the AIC’s well-practiced methodology for assessing the costs of serious and organised crime to estimate the costs of espionage. That cost amounts to $12.5 billion for 2023–24, capturing direct costs of known or suspected espionage, and public and private sector mitigation and response costs. In addition, the study estimates that effective mitigations and counter-espionage activities have prevented tens of billions of dollars’ worth of espionage costs.
As ASIO and the AIC highlight, these estimates are conservative. Using ASIO’s narrow definition of espionage—theft of Australian information, critically, by or for a foreign government that is seeking an advantage over Australia—the AIC broke down some estimates of costs across society and the economy:
—Cyber security incidents affecting larger businesses cost up to $1,193.8 million, while those affecting universities cost up to $14.5 million;
—State or state-sponsored insider threats cost the private sector up to $324.8 million and universities up to $25 million; and
—Cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property and trade secrets cost businesses up to $1,1901 million and universities $628 million.
Cost estimates also included (unitemised) cybersecurity costs for the federal government.
There is a danger that the eye-watering $12.5 billion figure could induce paralysis. If spying is so persistent, and the cost is so great, then why not shrug our shoulders? Is it not just the cost of doing business, including lucrative business with China?
It’s here that the prevented costs are so arresting, not least because their mirror image is the costs we are likely risking if mitigations fail. The AIC developed a series of scenarios to estimate these kinds of potential losses. This led to findings that an economy-wide, week-long disruption to industries dependent on digital technologies could cost Australia over $5.9 billion, and that trade secrets theft from a large, publicly listed Australian company could cost up to $887 million per incident.
Burgess also made clear that espionage takes wholly unexpected forms, highlighting the whole-of-nation challenge. This has included, for example, the theft of fruit tree branches from a sensitive Australian horticultural facility, resulting in foreign reverse engineering and replication of what took Australian scientists two decades of research and development.
And then there are those costs that simply won’t be found in a spreadsheet.
Espionage is not simply about stealing secrets. Whether through human agents, cyber intrusions, insider access, or open-source exploitation, espionage provides the intelligence needed for malign states to calibrate coercive strategies targeting our sovereignty, economic competitiveness and social cohesion. Modern espionage enables not just intelligence collection, but manipulation, disruption and strategic shaping. It doesn’t stop at the exfiltration of information. Increasingly, it’s about embedding influence and pre-positioning for strategic effect. Access is used not only to survey and monitor but to shape systems from within.
Cyber operations, legal commercial activities, academic partnerships and dual-use AI technologies now intersect to enable state-sponsored espionage at scale. Cyber intrusions silently map networks and exfiltrate data, open-source information is weaponised to tailor influence operations, and commercial espionage undermines the development of sovereign technologies.
In this hybrid threat landscape, espionage doesn’t just support state objectives; it powers them. It allows malign states to apply sustained pressure without crossing the threshold of armed conflict, leveraging ambiguity to avoid accountability. Understanding the true cost of espionage means recognising it as the enabler of a strategic environment where information is weaponised, trust is degraded and resilience is tested.
As international competition intensifies, malign states such as China and Russia should be expected to increasingly favour persistent access over one-off breaches. This includes embedding themselves in critical infrastructure, for example, to enable pre-positioned leverage.
For Australia, these risks have real consequences. Compromises in defence, research, or critical industries and infrastructure can have cascading national effects, from reputational damage and supply chain disruption to the erosion of societal trust, or as Burgess described it: ‘The potential loss of strategic advantage, sovereign decision-making and warfighting capacity’. This danger is greatly compounded by the potential costs of a compromise of the AUKUS program, which would expose Washington and London’s most sensitive secrets.
This only underscores Burgess’s long-standing case for a national security approach that is genuinely national. The government’s current counter-espionage investments are delivering dividends. But as he reiterated, ‘Security is a shared responsibility, and in the prevailing threat environment, national security truly is national security—everybody’s business.’
We need to be clear: ASIO is the security service, but it’s not our security manager. Burgess gave practical advice applicable not just to espionage but to criminal theft, fraud, workplace accidents and equipment failures: ‘Understand the threat, identify the risk, manage the risk.’ All require a coherent, connected strategy across whole enterprises—people, places, technology and information.
The work of ASIO and the AIC in producing this report is vital. If ASIO’s job is to catch the spies, this report is about driving the national shift needed to make it harder for foreign spies to succeed in the first place. Quantifying the cost of espionage helps us all begin to close the gaps that malign states so effectively exploit.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/e...-5-billion-a-year-asio-shows-us-the-receipts/
Espionage costs Australia more than $12.5 billion a year: ASIO shows us the receipts
Spying by nation states is not new, and despite our geography, Australia has never been immune. This was made abundantly clear in a unique study, released last night by Director-General of Security Mike Burgess. Thanks to this study, Australians now have a sophisticated estimate of the cost of espionage directed against our governments, businesses and universities: at least $12.5 billion in just a single year.
While giving the 26th annual Hawke lecture, Burgess was measured, but still frank in his disbelief at the mix of inertia, naivety and fatalism that Australians are demonstrating across sectors (not just across government departments) in response to the threat of espionage. Burgess outlined that on all levels—government, industry and individual—behavioural responses are key to arresting the threat, or at least mitigating it more effectively. This tells us we need to stop leaving the house unlocked while shouting down the street that we have valuables on the kitchen bench.
As the result of a unique study by the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) on behalf of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, The Cost of Espionage does what it says on the tin: it uses the AIC’s well-practiced methodology for assessing the costs of serious and organised crime to estimate the costs of espionage. That cost amounts to $12.5 billion for 2023–24, capturing direct costs of known or suspected espionage, and public and private sector mitigation and response costs. In addition, the study estimates that effective mitigations and counter-espionage activities have prevented tens of billions of dollars’ worth of espionage costs.
As ASIO and the AIC highlight, these estimates are conservative. Using ASIO’s narrow definition of espionage—theft of Australian information, critically, by or for a foreign government that is seeking an advantage over Australia—the AIC broke down some estimates of costs across society and the economy:
—Cyber security incidents affecting larger businesses cost up to $1,193.8 million, while those affecting universities cost up to $14.5 million;
—State or state-sponsored insider threats cost the private sector up to $324.8 million and universities up to $25 million; and
—Cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property and trade secrets cost businesses up to $1,1901 million and universities $628 million.
Cost estimates also included (unitemised) cybersecurity costs for the federal government.
There is a danger that the eye-watering $12.5 billion figure could induce paralysis. If spying is so persistent, and the cost is so great, then why not shrug our shoulders? Is it not just the cost of doing business, including lucrative business with China?
It’s here that the prevented costs are so arresting, not least because their mirror image is the costs we are likely risking if mitigations fail. The AIC developed a series of scenarios to estimate these kinds of potential losses. This led to findings that an economy-wide, week-long disruption to industries dependent on digital technologies could cost Australia over $5.9 billion, and that trade secrets theft from a large, publicly listed Australian company could cost up to $887 million per incident.
Burgess also made clear that espionage takes wholly unexpected forms, highlighting the whole-of-nation challenge. This has included, for example, the theft of fruit tree branches from a sensitive Australian horticultural facility, resulting in foreign reverse engineering and replication of what took Australian scientists two decades of research and development.
And then there are those costs that simply won’t be found in a spreadsheet.
Espionage is not simply about stealing secrets. Whether through human agents, cyber intrusions, insider access, or open-source exploitation, espionage provides the intelligence needed for malign states to calibrate coercive strategies targeting our sovereignty, economic competitiveness and social cohesion. Modern espionage enables not just intelligence collection, but manipulation, disruption and strategic shaping. It doesn’t stop at the exfiltration of information. Increasingly, it’s about embedding influence and pre-positioning for strategic effect. Access is used not only to survey and monitor but to shape systems from within.
Cyber operations, legal commercial activities, academic partnerships and dual-use AI technologies now intersect to enable state-sponsored espionage at scale. Cyber intrusions silently map networks and exfiltrate data, open-source information is weaponised to tailor influence operations, and commercial espionage undermines the development of sovereign technologies.
In this hybrid threat landscape, espionage doesn’t just support state objectives; it powers them. It allows malign states to apply sustained pressure without crossing the threshold of armed conflict, leveraging ambiguity to avoid accountability. Understanding the true cost of espionage means recognising it as the enabler of a strategic environment where information is weaponised, trust is degraded and resilience is tested.
As international competition intensifies, malign states such as China and Russia should be expected to increasingly favour persistent access over one-off breaches. This includes embedding themselves in critical infrastructure, for example, to enable pre-positioned leverage.
For Australia, these risks have real consequences. Compromises in defence, research, or critical industries and infrastructure can have cascading national effects, from reputational damage and supply chain disruption to the erosion of societal trust, or as Burgess described it: ‘The potential loss of strategic advantage, sovereign decision-making and warfighting capacity’. This danger is greatly compounded by the potential costs of a compromise of the AUKUS program, which would expose Washington and London’s most sensitive secrets.
This only underscores Burgess’s long-standing case for a national security approach that is genuinely national. The government’s current counter-espionage investments are delivering dividends. But as he reiterated, ‘Security is a shared responsibility, and in the prevailing threat environment, national security truly is national security—everybody’s business.’
We need to be clear: ASIO is the security service, but it’s not our security manager. Burgess gave practical advice applicable not just to espionage but to criminal theft, fraud, workplace accidents and equipment failures: ‘Understand the threat, identify the risk, manage the risk.’ All require a coherent, connected strategy across whole enterprises—people, places, technology and information.
The work of ASIO and the AIC in producing this report is vital. If ASIO’s job is to catch the spies, this report is about driving the national shift needed to make it harder for foreign spies to succeed in the first place. Quantifying the cost of espionage helps us all begin to close the gaps that malign states so effectively exploit.
Last edited:
OmarsCominYo
Member
We could just about write the book on this after the last few years...
"....Espionage is not simply about stealing secrets. Whether through human agents, cyber intrusions, insider access, or open-source exploitation, espionage provides the intelligence needed for malign states to calibrate coercive strategies targeting our sovereignty, economic competitiveness and social cohesion. Modern espionage enables not just intelligence collection, but manipulation, disruption and strategic shaping. It doesn’t stop at the exfiltration of information. Increasingly, it’s about embedding influence and pre-positioning for strategic effect. Access is used not only to survey and monitor but to shape systems from within.
Cyber operations, legal commercial activities, academic partnerships and dual-use AI technologies now intersect to enable state-sponsored espionage at scale. Cyber intrusions silently map networks and exfiltrate data, open-source information is weaponised to tailor influence operations, and commercial espionage undermines the development of sovereign technologies.
In this hybrid threat landscape, espionage doesn’t just support state objectives; it powers them. It allows malign states to apply sustained pressure without crossing the threshold of armed conflict, leveraging ambiguity to avoid accountability. Understanding the true cost of espionage means recognising it as the enabler of a strategic environment where information is weaponised, trust is degraded and resilience is tested...."
"....Espionage is not simply about stealing secrets. Whether through human agents, cyber intrusions, insider access, or open-source exploitation, espionage provides the intelligence needed for malign states to calibrate coercive strategies targeting our sovereignty, economic competitiveness and social cohesion. Modern espionage enables not just intelligence collection, but manipulation, disruption and strategic shaping. It doesn’t stop at the exfiltration of information. Increasingly, it’s about embedding influence and pre-positioning for strategic effect. Access is used not only to survey and monitor but to shape systems from within.
Cyber operations, legal commercial activities, academic partnerships and dual-use AI technologies now intersect to enable state-sponsored espionage at scale. Cyber intrusions silently map networks and exfiltrate data, open-source information is weaponised to tailor influence operations, and commercial espionage undermines the development of sovereign technologies.
In this hybrid threat landscape, espionage doesn’t just support state objectives; it powers them. It allows malign states to apply sustained pressure without crossing the threshold of armed conflict, leveraging ambiguity to avoid accountability. Understanding the true cost of espionage means recognising it as the enabler of a strategic environment where information is weaponised, trust is degraded and resilience is tested...."
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I thought they said the same when FELIX had taken power..??
DRC has always had issues with corruption...imo>>!
So WHY would things change...imo..!!!!!
Anchorman
Emerged
maybe they GIVE IT to CHINA or the US…??? But WITHOUT clearing AVZ’s RIGHTS..? I DON'T think so..!! AVZ has the DFS… the JV… the TENURE..! You think the DRC wants INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION..?? More delays..? BAD LOOK..!! Investors would RUN..!
Zijin ILLEGALLY obtained the NORTH … but the North and SOUTH is STILL AVZ’s imo..!
You can’t just WIPE that away… doesn’t work like that..!!
I wish you valuation, opinion has SUBSTANCE
By DRC records ZIJIN owns the NORTH and has a M L...!...imo
But the SOUTH is still swinging in the BREEZE...imo
Nigel ANN concerns me on his intentions...imo..!
Anchorman
Emerged
The SUBSTANCE comes from the WORLD STAGE.. not the corrupt DRC.. LMAO..!!!
You KNOW the DRC have REQUESTED SECURITY from the US...???
That’s a HOT TOPIC right now... not a Questionable signature... imo...!
The SOUTH still IN PLAY is it not?????????? ... make no mistake...!
Retrobyte
Hates a beer
Maybe DYOR and you can find the TRUTH before you INVEST...imo
- Resource Curse:
The DRC's abundant natural resources are a source of corruption and conflict.
legal frameworks, and the underlying factors that fuel corruption, according to Transparency International. ....imo
Skar
Regular
US involvement is the only reason, otherwise I think our only course would be compensation through courts.
One of the biggest problem is as well, what Nigel mentioned earlier...Where is the border between south and north ?
What about the core library ? What about the camp? What about the power?
All questions which have to be sorted before AVZ jumps to bed with Kobold..
And Zijin have to agree to that...FUCK Zijin
What about the core library ? What about the camp? What about the power?
All questions which have to be sorted before AVZ jumps to bed with Kobold..
And Zijin have to agree to that...FUCK Zijin
I think no one knows the ANSWERS...imo..!
That's WHY they need to take one step at a TIME in regards to this SAGA...imo..!
They need to come to some sort of agreement...imo
Anchorman
Emerged
The TRUTH is the DRC doesn’t NEED more “frameworks”... it needs INTEGRITY and ENFORCEMENT...!
You think DYOR will help when the ENTIRE SYSTEM is compromised...???? LMAO
The RESOURCE CURSE is REAL... but so is the CORRUPTION CURSE...!
Transparency International can’t FIX a rigged game...imo
The TRUTH is on the GROUND... not in their REPORTS...!!!
Anchorman
Emerged
Exactly...! NOBODY has the full picture... and anyone who says they do needs their HEAD CHECKED...imo..!!
This is a LAYERED SAGA... built on MISTRUST, MONEY, and MOTIVES...!
ONE STEP AT A TIME is the ONLY way forward... they need to SIT... TALK... and come to COMMON GROUND... do they NOT???????!
Until then...? It’s just noise and posturing...imo..!!
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