Presumably the USA has predicted the DRC v M23 peace discussions not achieving results and hence, the USA has a Plan B.
The DRC sweeteners are well know, and the possible M23 sweeteners from Copliot are listed below. However, I suspect that Plan B will also need appeal to their greed and offer sweeteners direct to the individuals in power because they are too impatient and want the perks immediately. But how can the USA do this without bribes?
Here’s what’s likely on the table:
Indirect Incentives & Strategic Leverage
What’s Been Said Publicly
The DRC sweeteners are well know, and the possible M23 sweeteners from Copliot are listed below. However, I suspect that Plan B will also need appeal to their greed and offer sweeteners direct to the individuals in power because they are too impatient and want the perks immediately. But how can the USA do this without bribes?
Here’s what’s likely on the table:

Category | Potential Sweeteners | Purpose |
---|---|---|
Security Guarantees | U.S. backing for buffer zones and third-party monitoring in eastern DRC | To reassure M23 that territorial withdrawals won’t lead to reprisals |
Political Reintegration Pathways | Support for transitional justice mechanisms and limited amnesty | To allow M23 leaders to re-enter civilian life without blanket impunity |
Economic Development | U.S. investment in infrastructure and mining corridors (e.g. Lobito) | To create jobs and reduce M23’s reliance on illicit mining revenues |
Regional Diplomacy | Pressure on Rwanda to scale back support and endorse M23’s exit strategy | To isolate hardliners and encourage compliance from M23 factions |

- The U.S. State Department has acknowledged that preliminary discussions with Congolese and Rwandan officials include “security arrangements” that would benefit all parties, including M23 indirectly.
- M23 reportedly earns ~$300,000/month from mining in eastern Congo, so any deal that secures economic alternatives could be seen as a de facto sweetener.