Xerof
Flaming 1967
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AVZ Discussion 2022
- Thread starter GazDix
- Start date
BRICK
Where’s Zeebot 😶🌫️
Ahh the 80s.....
Xerof
Flaming 1967
I have wondered, on the darkest nights, why Jules A-Key hasn't poked around CAMI, but of course, then I remember that Sama reinstated J-FMK over the newly appointed CEO, so I guess that answers all my wonderment
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Maybe change your name to
SchRHodyNger(1980)
Your interpretation of American (the failing empire) is not an accurate geo-political assessment of the current situation.
1. America is determined to become a clean-energy superpower.
2. America wants to hinder China’s technological innovation through control of their semiconductors. The most reliable engine of long-term growth. It’s already happening.
Has China’s power peaked?
June 07, 2023Ian Bremmer
Jess Frampton
I had a fascinating debate on this question a few months ago with political scientist Michael Beckley, who wrote a thoughtful and compelling book arguing that China’s relative rise is over and, therefore, that the United States will remain the world’s sole superpower for the foreseeable future.
This isn’t a new claim. In fact, every few years going back decades we get a new big article or booksaying China’s power is peaking and its decline (or even collapse) is imminent. So far, they’ve always been wrong. But could it be true this time?
Let’s break down the strongest arguments on both sides and decide (spoiler: I say “not so fast”).
Why China has peaked already
The exceptional rise of China over the past 40 years was just that – exceptional. It relied on a lucky combination of unique and irreplicable tailwinds that are rapidly turning into headwinds. By almost every metric, things have already stopped getting better and are starting to get worse for China.China’s economic slowdown is structural. As China has grown wealthier, its labor force has become more expensive, diminishing the country’s attractiveness as the “factory of the world.” Official GDP growth had already dropped to 6% before 2019, despite government stimulus masking even weaker underlying growth, and three years of COVID-19 lockdowns only made it worse.
Not only has growth slowed every year for a decade, but most importantly, the quality of China’s growth has deteriorated. Infrastructure has been overbuilt to juice up growth, with dozens of “ghost cities” outfitted with new apartment buildings, roads, and bridges … and no people – the definition of growth without productivity. All this stimulus has been financed by an explosive debt bubble that Beijing has shown little willingness or ability to deflate.
Meanwhile, China’s closed political system and Xi’s statist economic preferences hinder technological innovation, the most reliable engine of long-term growth. While China’s research and development spending has increased massively, the Chinese Communist Party’s increasingly heavy-handed interventions in the tech sector are chilling entrepreneurship and technological experimentation. Many of China’s best and brightest have already left the mainland for more welcoming environments, taking their talent and capital with them. Add to that Western export controls on semiconductors and other dual-use advanced technologies, and China’s tech capabilities will face major binding constraints soon.
China faces the worst demographic trajectory of any country we’ve seen in peacetime. Its 1.4 billion population peaked last year and is now starting to shrink, owing to aging and plummeting birth rates. By 2035, China is estimated to lose roughly 70 million working-age adults and add 130 million seniors. Studies put its total population in 2100 anywhere between 700 million and 475 million (!), at which point one in three Chinese citizens will be over the age of 65. President Xi Jinping’s decisions to end China’s one- and then two-child policies have failed to reverse these trends, and in all likelihood, so will any new policies to boost birth rates short of liberalizing immigration (something Beijing is loath to do). The fact that the demographic implosion has hit China before it’s had a chance to grow wealthy makes its economic and political implications all the more dire.
China faces an increasingly hostile external environment. This is embodied by the United States’ explicit policy of containment of China’s tech sector as well as China’s growing strategic encirclement in its own backyard – where Japan and South Korea are increasing their defense spending, Taiwan grows more defiant by the day, and new anti-China alliances like the Quad and AUKUS are blooming like algae. Relations with India, meanwhile, have become more competitive on the back of military clashes on the shared border, causing Delhi to draw closer to Washington. Anti-China sentiment more broadly has increased as China’s global footprint has expanded, with more than 10 countries having suspended or canceled high-profile projects funded by the Belt and Road Initiative. Meanwhile, China’s closest allies are imploding, with Russia now a pariah in the West, Pakistan’s economy in tatters, and North Korea having gone fully rogue.
China is ruled by an error-prone and capricious dictator who’s unfettered in his ability to pursue his statist and nationalist policy agenda. Much like Russia under Vladimir Putin, the unprecedentedconsolidation of power under Xi means less transparency and debate, less feedback flowing to the top, more arbitrary decisions, and more policy volatility. Dramatic shifts like the haphazard exit from “zero COVID” are inevitable in an environment of poor information and blind loyalty, radically increasing the risk of miscalculation and accidents and further undermining China’s growth and stability.
Why China hasn’t peaked yet
It’s true that unprecedented headwinds make China’s continued growth more challenging. It’s therefore possible that China will never surpass the United States economically or become a global superpower. But the question is whether China’s power has already peaked, and that’s just not the case.Yes, China’s economy is growing slower than it used to … but it is still growing faster than America’s. You’d expect growth to slow in any low-income country that has become middle-income in the span of a generation. Still, the IMF projects that China will continue to narrow the gap with the US in the coming decade – growing from 73% of US GDP today to roughly 87% by 2027 and achieving parity around 2030. Chinese labor costs remain dramatically lower than in advanced industrial economies, and China’s already deep integration into global value chains means any decoupling will be slow and incremental rather than sudden and absolute.
As for quality, China’s growth hasn’t been primarily stimulus-driven since shortly after the global financial crisis (except for the COVID reopening period). And while infrastructure spending used to be unproductive, eventually that led to fiscal reforms imposing stricter profitability conditions. Indebtedness is admittedly a huge issue that Beijing has delayed dealing with through the pandemic, but the government remains committed (at least in principle) to getting it under control.
Xi is ideologically committed to a statist economic agenda that will drag on Chinese growth, but he also understands that he shouldn’t kill the goose that lays the golden eggs (the private sector in general, the tech sector in particular). China continues to invest massive state resources in advanced technologies, and it has already achieved parity or surpassed the US in many fields (e.g., voice/facial recognition, smart infrastructure, telecommunications, and electric vehicles). If AI ends up becoming the new commanding height of the global economy (as I think it will), China’s data advantage and strong AI talent pipeline will make it competitive if not dominant.
Demographics are an undeniably real and massive challenge for China … but not a near-term one. And there are plenty of things Beijing can do to kick this can down the road. For example, China’s retirement age is low by international standards (60 for men, 50-55 for women) and hasn’t changed in decades despite big jumps in life expectancy. China can halve its demographic tax by 2035 by bringing 40 million more people into the workforce – a reform Xi flagged in his recent Party Congress report.
Moreover, China’s educational system has only recently seen dramatic increases in funding, with the associated improvements in labor force quality still to come (especially in rural areas). China can further boost productivity by increasing urbanization (now at 65%, compared to an average of 80% in developed countries) and, in particular, moving workers out of low-productivity agriculture (still 25% of the workforce, compared to 3% in most industrialized countries). All this room to grow its labor force participation and productivity gives China a minimum of 10-15 years of runway to address the more stubborn challenge posed by low birth rates.
China’s external environment has become hostile … but no one really wants a “cold war” with Beijing. While the US-China relationship is tilting more antagonistic, Biden (and Xi for that matter) wants to put a floor under it. His containment policy seems to be limited only to narrow sectors deemed critical to national security. And while most US allies want a stronger security relationship with Washington and they’ll abide by any potential US sanctions, none are prepared to decouple economically from China as they have from Russia. China continues to be by far the most important trade partner for nearly all the world’s developing countries – most of whom are sympathetic to Beijing’s prioritization of economic development over ideological alignment.
China has the largest diplomatic network in the world, and its global soft power projection is just getting started. Increased hostility toward Beijing among most wealthy countries doesn’t change the reality that for much of the world, there simply are no feasible economic alternatives at scale. Despite all the talk about decoupling, even the US remains happy to continue selling record levels of agricultural exports to China.
Xi isn’t Putin. His decision to shift away from his zero-COVID policy in response to public demonstrations was clunky and poorly executed, but it was a better choice than cracking down on demonstrators or doubling down on a failed policy – which is what the Russian dictator would have done. Xi remains considerably more risk-averse than him.
My take
This is a dramatically more challenging domestic and global environment than China has experienced in decades … and it’s only going to get worse. But while China faces “stormy seas,” I think on balance it still has substantial upside. That’s why things like AUKUS and the Quad keep popping up: not because the US and its allies think China’s power has peaked, but because they know that it will continue to increase.A “Chinese century” may not be in the cards, but another decade of reasonably robust economic growth and increased international influence is very likely.
John25
Regular
Even Nigel is wishing us happy 60 th …looks xmas in July come earlyWell SH’s we have made it ..60 weeks in Limbo
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RHyNO
Regular
Fascinating article, I tend to agree, China still growing faster than US but unless they take Taiwan and its manufacturing unlikely they will become a larger global superpower than USA. I really hopeYour interpretation of American (the failing empire) is not an accurate geo-political assessment of the current situation.
1. America is determined to become a clean-energy superpower.
2. America wants to hinder China’s technological innovation through control of their semiconductors. The most reliable engine of long-term growth. It’s already happening.
Has China’s power peaked?
June 07, 2023
Ian Bremmer
Jess Frampton
I had a fascinating debate on this question a few months ago with political scientist Michael Beckley, who wrote a thoughtful and compelling book arguing that China’s relative rise is over and, therefore, that the United States will remain the world’s sole superpower for the foreseeable future.
This isn’t a new claim. In fact, every few years going back decades we get a new big article or booksaying China’s power is peaking and its decline (or even collapse) is imminent. So far, they’ve always been wrong. But could it be true this time?
Let’s break down the strongest arguments on both sides and decide (spoiler: I say “not so fast”).
Why China has peaked already
The exceptional rise of China over the past 40 years was just that – exceptional. It relied on a lucky combination of unique and irreplicable tailwinds that are rapidly turning into headwinds. By almost every metric, things have already stopped getting better and are starting to get worse for China.
China’s economic slowdown is structural. As China has grown wealthier, its labor force has become more expensive, diminishing the country’s attractiveness as the “factory of the world.” Official GDP growth had already dropped to 6% before 2019, despite government stimulus masking even weaker underlying growth, and three years of COVID-19 lockdowns only made it worse.
Not only has growth slowed every year for a decade, but most importantly, the quality of China’s growth has deteriorated. Infrastructure has been overbuilt to juice up growth, with dozens of “ghost cities” outfitted with new apartment buildings, roads, and bridges … and no people – the definition of growth without productivity. All this stimulus has been financed by an explosive debt bubble that Beijing has shown little willingness or ability to deflate.
Meanwhile, China’s closed political system and Xi’s statist economic preferences hinder technological innovation, the most reliable engine of long-term growth. While China’s research and development spending has increased massively, the Chinese Communist Party’s increasingly heavy-handed interventions in the tech sector are chilling entrepreneurship and technological experimentation. Many of China’s best and brightest have already left the mainland for more welcoming environments, taking their talent and capital with them. Add to that Western export controls on semiconductors and other dual-use advanced technologies, and China’s tech capabilities will face major binding constraints soon.
China faces the worst demographic trajectory of any country we’ve seen in peacetime. Its 1.4 billion population peaked last year and is now starting to shrink, owing to aging and plummeting birth rates. By 2035, China is estimated to lose roughly 70 million working-age adults and add 130 million seniors. Studies put its total population in 2100 anywhere between 700 million and 475 million (!), at which point one in three Chinese citizens will be over the age of 65. President Xi Jinping’s decisions to end China’s one- and then two-child policies have failed to reverse these trends, and in all likelihood, so will any new policies to boost birth rates short of liberalizing immigration (something Beijing is loath to do). The fact that the demographic implosion has hit China before it’s had a chance to grow wealthy makes its economic and political implications all the more dire.
China faces an increasingly hostile external environment. This is embodied by the United States’ explicit policy of containment of China’s tech sector as well as China’s growing strategic encirclement in its own backyard – where Japan and South Korea are increasing their defense spending, Taiwan grows more defiant by the day, and new anti-China alliances like the Quad and AUKUS are blooming like algae. Relations with India, meanwhile, have become more competitive on the back of military clashes on the shared border, causing Delhi to draw closer to Washington. Anti-China sentiment more broadly has increased as China’s global footprint has expanded, with more than 10 countries having suspended or canceled high-profile projects funded by the Belt and Road Initiative. Meanwhile, China’s closest allies are imploding, with Russia now a pariah in the West, Pakistan’s economy in tatters, and North Korea having gone fully rogue.
China is ruled by an error-prone and capricious dictator who’s unfettered in his ability to pursue his statist and nationalist policy agenda. Much like Russia under Vladimir Putin, the unprecedentedconsolidation of power under Xi means less transparency and debate, less feedback flowing to the top, more arbitrary decisions, and more policy volatility. Dramatic shifts like the haphazard exit from “zero COVID” are inevitable in an environment of poor information and blind loyalty, radically increasing the risk of miscalculation and accidents and further undermining China’s growth and stability.
Why China hasn’t peaked yet
It’s true that unprecedented headwinds make China’s continued growth more challenging. It’s therefore possible that China will never surpass the United States economically or become a global superpower. But the question is whether China’s power has already peaked, and that’s just not the case.
Yes, China’s economy is growing slower than it used to … but it is still growing faster than America’s. You’d expect growth to slow in any low-income country that has become middle-income in the span of a generation. Still, the IMF projects that China will continue to narrow the gap with the US in the coming decade – growing from 73% of US GDP today to roughly 87% by 2027 and achieving parity around 2030. Chinese labor costs remain dramatically lower than in advanced industrial economies, and China’s already deep integration into global value chains means any decoupling will be slow and incremental rather than sudden and absolute.
As for quality, China’s growth hasn’t been primarily stimulus-driven since shortly after the global financial crisis (except for the COVID reopening period). And while infrastructure spending used to be unproductive, eventually that led to fiscal reforms imposing stricter profitability conditions. Indebtedness is admittedly a huge issue that Beijing has delayed dealing with through the pandemic, but the government remains committed (at least in principle) to getting it under control.
Xi is ideologically committed to a statist economic agenda that will drag on Chinese growth, but he also understands that he shouldn’t kill the goose that lays the golden eggs (the private sector in general, the tech sector in particular). China continues to invest massive state resources in advanced technologies, and it has already achieved parity or surpassed the US in many fields (e.g., voice/facial recognition, smart infrastructure, telecommunications, and electric vehicles). If AI ends up becoming the new commanding height of the global economy (as I think it will), China’s data advantage and strong AI talent pipeline will make it competitive if not dominant.
Demographics are an undeniably real and massive challenge for China … but not a near-term one. And there are plenty of things Beijing can do to kick this can down the road. For example, China’s retirement age is low by international standards (60 for men, 50-55 for women) and hasn’t changed in decades despite big jumps in life expectancy. China can halve its demographic tax by 2035 by bringing 40 million more people into the workforce – a reform Xi flagged in his recent Party Congress report.
Moreover, China’s educational system has only recently seen dramatic increases in funding, with the associated improvements in labor force quality still to come (especially in rural areas). China can further boost productivity by increasing urbanization (now at 65%, compared to an average of 80% in developed countries) and, in particular, moving workers out of low-productivity agriculture (still 25% of the workforce, compared to 3% in most industrialized countries). All this room to grow its labor force participation and productivity gives China a minimum of 10-15 years of runway to address the more stubborn challenge posed by low birth rates.
China’s external environment has become hostile … but no one really wants a “cold war” with Beijing. While the US-China relationship is tilting more antagonistic, Biden (and Xi for that matter) wants to put a floor under it. His containment policy seems to be limited only to narrow sectors deemed critical to national security. And while most US allies want a stronger security relationship with Washington and they’ll abide by any potential US sanctions, none are prepared to decouple economically from China as they have from Russia. China continues to be by far the most important trade partner for nearly all the world’s developing countries – most of whom are sympathetic to Beijing’s prioritization of economic development over ideological alignment.
China has the largest diplomatic network in the world, and its global soft power projection is just getting started. Increased hostility toward Beijing among most wealthy countries doesn’t change the reality that for much of the world, there simply are no feasible economic alternatives at scale. Despite all the talk about decoupling, even the US remains happy to continue selling record levels of agricultural exports to China.
Xi isn’t Putin. His decision to shift away from his zero-COVID policy in response to public demonstrations was clunky and poorly executed, but it was a better choice than cracking down on demonstrators or doubling down on a failed policy – which is what the Russian dictator would have done. Xi remains considerably more risk-averse than him.
My take
This is a dramatically more challenging domestic and global environment than China has experienced in decades … and it’s only going to get worse. But while China faces “stormy seas,” I think on balance it still has substantial upside. That’s why things like AUKUS and the Quad keep popping up: not because the US and its allies think China’s power has peaked, but because they know that it will continue to increase.
A “Chinese century” may not be in the cards, but another decade of reasonably robust economic growth and increased international influence is very likely.
1. Biden is gone soon
2. DRC realise the damage in aligning with China.
Retrobyte
Hates a beer
If it's French it will be piss easy for us now
Frank
Top 20
The IMF has concluded the fourth review of the Extended Credit Facility Agreement with the DRC.
The Executive Board of the IMF concluded this Wednesday, June 28, 2023, the fourth review of the Extended Credit Facility Agreement with the DRC.
This decision by the IMF authorizes a disbursement of 203.3 million USD which will consolidate the international reserves.
This 5th disbursement brings total disbursements to date to SDR 761.5 million (about $1 billion 17 million) to support balance of payments needs.
The Congolese economy has shown obvious resilience and performance.
Real GDP growth is estimated at 8.9% in 2022, supported by higher than expected mining production, which has also led to a significant increase in government revenue.
The IMF confirms in its report that the progress made under the Program remains satisfactory.
All end-2022 performance criteria were met, including the various structural benchmarks.
All indicative targets were also achieved.
mediacongo
*Just to remind the
in the DRC running this Shit Show
The Executive Board of the IMF concluded this Wednesday, June 28, 2023, the fourth review of the Extended Credit Facility Agreement with the DRC.
This decision by the IMF authorizes a disbursement of 203.3 million USD which will consolidate the international reserves.
This 5th disbursement brings total disbursements to date to SDR 761.5 million (about $1 billion 17 million) to support balance of payments needs.
The Congolese economy has shown obvious resilience and performance.
Real GDP growth is estimated at 8.9% in 2022, supported by higher than expected mining production, which has also led to a significant increase in government revenue.
The IMF confirms in its report that the progress made under the Program remains satisfactory.
All end-2022 performance criteria were met, including the various structural benchmarks.
All indicative targets were also achieved.
mediacongo
*Just to remind the
in the DRC running this Shit Show
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Xerof
Flaming 1967
Ok, I would like to get to the bottom of this development around CAMI now showing COMINIERE as 100% ownership
When the ML was issued as a MoM decree, CAMI updated their site, showing the split tenement for 13359. We were in disbelief initially, but it was eventually confirmed by AVZ, and by discovery of the decree, that indeed the tenement had been split. We know AVZ appeared to have been duped into agreeing to the split, but thats just a red herring: the CAMI site update was correct
When the ML was revoked, and 13359 restored to its original 221 carre but back to a PR from PE, we eventually got notification from AVZ and MoM decrees. So the CAMI site was correct
My point at this stage is that CAMI has been updated with the correct information provided by the higher authorities
This latest update to ownership being in COMINIERE's name 100% has had no confirmation from anyone of any credibility, not AVZ (at least not directly, but perhaps inferred via the application to ICSID), nor any MoM decrees surfacing. We have only had gloating notification from the psychopathic cunt via an unconfirmed twitter account, and gleefully tailgated by his lemming followers
I simply ask:
WHAT THE FUCK IS GOING ON?
Does anyone have credible evidence that DATHCOM still holds the PR over 13359, or alternatively, credible evidence that they don't
When the ML was issued as a MoM decree, CAMI updated their site, showing the split tenement for 13359. We were in disbelief initially, but it was eventually confirmed by AVZ, and by discovery of the decree, that indeed the tenement had been split. We know AVZ appeared to have been duped into agreeing to the split, but thats just a red herring: the CAMI site update was correct
When the ML was revoked, and 13359 restored to its original 221 carre but back to a PR from PE, we eventually got notification from AVZ and MoM decrees. So the CAMI site was correct
My point at this stage is that CAMI has been updated with the correct information provided by the higher authorities
This latest update to ownership being in COMINIERE's name 100% has had no confirmation from anyone of any credibility, not AVZ (at least not directly, but perhaps inferred via the application to ICSID), nor any MoM decrees surfacing. We have only had gloating notification from the psychopathic cunt via an unconfirmed twitter account, and gleefully tailgated by his lemming followers
I simply ask:
WHAT THE FUCK IS GOING ON?
Does anyone have credible evidence that DATHCOM still holds the PR over 13359, or alternatively, credible evidence that they don't
Carlos Danger
Top 20
Not a direct confirmation as such but the official announcement for the ICSID arbitration refers to 13359 as 'Dathcom's principal asset'
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Azzler
Top 20
It's a very good question mate.
I think we've all been expecting a response but so far nothing.
The only thing I've heard is that NF has said, unofficially, that we shouldn't take what the cami site says too seriously.
I've asked some more privy holders the same thing and that's all they got.
Not long ago someone on twitter posted their data digging of cami and found it still under the name Dathcom.
I think it was Jens who commented that the change might just be Window dressing.
It happened when Cominiere announced they're cancelling the JV, so I expect it was a part of that attempt.
But I feel like it's very uncool for management to have remained silent over the matter, I mean it's realy very fucking concerning to shareholders.
Even if they don't know what's going on themselves they should have responded to it immediately
Poor form, really poor form.
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Given that we are now in an ASX enforced suspension for not meeting our continuous disclosure obligations, do you think there's a likelihood that AVZ may not even provide an update on the CATH extension? If AVZ are in full black out mode to keep the detractors second guessing, why announce anything at the moment?
MoneyBags1348
Top 20
The IMF has concluded the fourth review of the Extended Credit Facility Agreement with the DRC.
The Executive Board of the IMF concluded this Wednesday, June 28, 2023, the fourth review of the Extended Credit Facility Agreement with the DRC.
This decision by the IMF authorizes a disbursement of 203.3 million USD which will consolidate the international reserves.
This 5th disbursement brings total disbursements to date to SDR 761.5 million (about $1 billion 17 million) to support balance of payments needs.
The Congolese economy has shown obvious resilience and performance.
Real GDP growth is estimated at 8.9% in 2022, supported by higher than expected mining production, which has also led to a significant increase in government revenue.
The IMF confirms in its report that the progress made under the Program remains satisfactory.
All end-2022 performance criteria were met, including the various structural benchmarks.
All indicative targets were also achieved.
mediacongo
*To Remind,
View attachment 39060
Thanks for providing more info Frank. I sent this off to the IMF this morning….
AVZ Minerals spent 6 years & millions of dollars developing the Manono Project. The project, ML & ownership delayed, then removed by the actions of Cominiere, Chinese company Zijin and Simon Cong (Read the IGF report)
AVZ carried out Soil Sampling Field Mapping Consulting Drilling Metallurgical Testing FEED Study Securing a lease on an Industrial Site for logistics (road haulage, rail & port services & infrastructure rehab to the road from Manono)
AVZ produced a 160 page DFS; Received DFS Technical Approval; Had a SEZ Agreement; Tendered for Mining Infrastructure; Followed the DRC Mining Code; Satisfied all required approvals - Environmental; Financial Capability (through Raising Capital, Negotiating Funding with Pan African DFI’s and Offtake Agreements for both Lithium and Tin); Favourable Cadastral & Technical Opinion of the DFS for the Manono project; Produced 85 page Sustainability Report including ESG & 7 ESIA Reports. Decree to award the ML was granted then taken away.
Unfortunately this was all I could get into the form because I was on my phone. I’ll be on my laptop later and will send a more detailed email to them later today
Might now be worth mentioning Mupande in every piece of information put out there relating to our project…. A lot of people know this arsewipe is corrupt and those who don’t should be informed
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Xerof
Flaming 1967
@Azzler
this is the post you refer to on data digging
I tried to get down the rabbit hole, but my arse got stuck at the entrance, and couldn't delve any deeper.
I wonder if @mooorning could run the query as of today and see if the result is the same ( or anyone else who knows how to use a computer, lol)
marksmann007
Regular
For what it’s worth on the cominidiots site the joint venture still remains unchanged for 13359
MoneyBags1348
Top 20
Unfortunately Marksmann I think the only thing they have updated is the date, they still have Athanase as the Director General (Managing Director) and I’m pretty sure he’s still in jail
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